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Abstract
This study aims to explore the role of profit-loss sharing (PLS) models to alleviate
access to finance for small and medium enterprises in Saudi Arabia, in the light of the
stringent requirements of traditional financial institutions, to ensure the growth and
development of the SME sector. A central question of this study is the extent to which
Islamic banks can adopt profit-loss sharing modes to finance SME. The main results
present the barriers preventing Islamic banks from the application of profit-loss sharing
that increase incidence of agency problems for such institutions. High asymmetry of
information and the nature of Islamic banks as depository institutions place more
constraints on extending finance on the basis of profit-loss sharing. Profit-loss sharing
dominates the literature of Islamic finance, however, there is a lack of rigorous empirical
evaluations of the potential benefits of profit-loss sharing to finance SMEs. There is a need
for public intervention to stimulate the role of non-banking institutions that are considered
more suitable for long-term, riskier investments to offer alternative finance for SMEs on
the basis of profit-loss sharing.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
i.

Research Objectives
This research examines the financing constraints facing small and medium

enterprises (SMEs) in Saudi Arabia. Profit-loss sharing (PLS) finance models are presented
as an Islamic alternative that meet the demands of entrepreneurs in Muslim countries, and
Saudi Arabia in particular, for Sharia-compliant SMEs finance. This research examines the
limitations of of PLS-based finance through Islamic banks which are explained by the
agency theory. It also explores the potential role of non-banking institutions (venture
capital) to adopt PLS instruments to finance innovation and entrepreneurial activities,
along with the current limitations to the development of Islamic venture capital industry in
Saudi Arabia.
ii.

Research Methodology
In this study, extensive literature review has been done on Islamic finance and small

and medium enterprises using books, peer-reviewed journal articles, official reports and
secondary data. The study uses a qualitative approach and present a discussion on the
efficacy and feasibility of Islamic equity finance and profit-loss sharing contracts to
increase the financial inclusion for small and medium enterprises.

1

iii.

Limitation of the Study
Profit-loss sharing modes are practiced on a very limited scale which make an

empirical analysis not possible due to the limitation of data. Profit-loss sharing modes are
theoretically presented as the ‘ideal’ modes of finance and can play a vital role in enhancing
entrepreneurial spirit in Muslim countries. However, studies on modern practical
application of PLS are yet to be done.

2

Chapter 2: The Role of Profit-Loss Sharing for Small and Medium Emprises.
2.1 Introduction
Small and medium enterprises are considered the engine of economic growth in
both developed and developing countries. A vibrant SMEs sector plays a major role
towards the generation of employment, fostering innovation and technology,
diversification of economic base, generation of exports revenues and creating industrial
linkages between large industries and SMEs for less dependence on imports (Durrani
2006). The growing interest in SMEs sector around the world is partially attributed to its
ability to absorb and quickly respond to market changes more effectively due to SMEs'
flexible production structures. Moreover, there is a wide agreement on the direct link
between job creation and poverty reduction as the lack of paid employment is a central
problem to poverty. The SME sector accounts for larger shares of employment in the
private sector, creates most of the new jobs and has the highest employment growth rate.
However, these inferences are widely based on observations of industrialize economies. In
developing countries, most of the SME are borne out of necessity, usually operate in
crowded markets and characterized with low productivity. Therefore, governments’ public
policy addressing poverty in developing countries should provide the required regulatory
and legal environment for the expansion of SMEs, low cost finance, business development
services, and market access. All of these factors could increase the productivity of the SME
sector and the quality of the jobs created (e.g. sufficient earnings, job security) in order to
3

capture the full potentials of SMEs in poverty alleviation (Vandenberg 2006; Deijl et al.
2013). A vibrant SMEs sector has also been used as an economic tool to production-base
diversification, particularly for oil-economies where the bulk of their national income
comes from the production and export of crude oil and oil- related products. In Saudi
Arabia, one of the main goals to diversify the economic base away from oil and maintain
less volatile national income is to increase the productivity of the private sector and its
contribution to GDP. Therefore, the status of small and medium enterprises should be
reconsidered. SMEs represent 99 percent of all enterprises and contribute with
approximately 22 percent to GDP which is considered a small contribution considering the
total number of SMEs and the country’s diversification policies. Moreover, SMEs could
be an important source of jobs and self-employment where the current structure of both
private and public sector is unable to absorb the increasing number of job seekers.
However, SMEs sector in Saudi Arabia faces many constraints that limit their growth and
development; such as the lack of unified procedures for smaller businesses, weak linkages
between SMEs and large enterprises, and the lack of infrastructure needed for market
access, particularly marketing and exports. The most important obstacle facing Saudi
SMEs is access to finance. SMEs are still viewed as high-risk to commercial banks and
more prone to failure, and with higher asymmetry of information, the lack of collateral
increases the difficulty of obtaining funds through banks. Lack of nonbanking financial
institutions added more constraints on SMEs’ access to finance. This paper focus will on
SMEs access to finance and possibility of developing Islamic financial instruments (profitloss sharing) to broaden funding opportunities for SMEs and the extent of government
intervention to provide subsidized finance to support economic reform plans.
4

2.2 Definitional Aspect of SMEs
The definition of SMEs includes a wide range of definitions that vary from country
to another depending on factors like the country's level of development, business culture
and enterprises characteristics within that particular country. In some cases, a definition of
SMEs does not exist. Adoption of single definition could be difficult and a challenging
task. Definitions of SMEs are usually designed to meet the needs for SMEs development
within the country (e.g. delivering greater access to finance), and subsequently design the
appropriate SMEs support programs to meet these needs. Using measures of size (i.e.
profits, turnovers) in different sectors would give a different result which might affect the
design of the appropriate regulatory framework, therefore, some countries adopt different
definitions for SMEs according to the type of activity. Multiple quantitative measures and
financial indicators are used such as the number of employees, assets size, sales, and
profitability, etc. According to (Abdelhamid et al 2003; Elasrag 2010), there are three main
quantitative measures that are commonly used to define SMEs. The number of employees
within the enterprise is usually the most common measure to define SMEs, however, it
varies from country to another depending on the degree of development of the country in
question. Another measure is the value of assets but it is not as common as the number of
employees because SMEs might face a difficulty in determining the precise value of their
assets or hesitance of SMEs' owner to reveal such information. Turnover per enterprise
which is also referred to as the value of sales or gross receipt and this measure is correlated
with other quantitative measures to define SMEs (Elasrag, 2016). In Saudi Arabia, a
definition did not exist nor a special government agency for SMEs until 2016, which
greatly restricted the ability to understand the SME sector and the issues that hindered its
5

development which in turn restricted SMEs access to finance and other forms of assistance
to stimulate the SME sector.
Employee’s No.

Revenues (Million SAR)

Micro

1-5

0-3

Small

6 - 49

3 - 40

Medium

50 - 249

40 – 200

Table 1: SMEs definition in Saudi Arabia (SMEA)

2.3 SMEs and Contribution to National Economy
SMEs can have crucial contributions towards economic growth and sustainability
by having a more diverse and balanced production base, fostering innovation and
technologies and other high-value-added activities that create linkages between large
industries and SMEs. In Saudi Arabia, SMEs represent 99 of all enterprises and contribute
with 29% of total revenues and nearly 22 percent of total GDP. This is in contrast with
most of the developed and developing economies where SMEs represent a large share of
total enterprises. The diversification of the economic base includes the diversification of
exports composition as well, however, SMEs only contribute with one percent of total
export of the country (SMEA). It is quite important to diversify the government revenues
to stabilize the economy in case of severe downturns in the oil market since oil revenues
are the main source of finance for economic and social development in the country.
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Figure 1:SMEs’ Contribution to National Economies (2011) .1
Source: country-specific official data.

The recent drop in oil prices had a negative impact on the Saudi economy which
pushed the country to accelerate the pace of diversification process and address the issues
facing the development of the private sector and SMEs (Al Baker 2015). In addition to
SMEs considerable contribution to GDP and provision of more affordable goods and
services domestically, SMEs dominate the business profiles in national economies and play
a vital role in the generation of income and jobs opportunities. However, due to differences
in SMEs' definitions and their characteristics across the world, in addition to the
inaccessibility to data on informal SMEs in developing countries, it is difficult to make
general conclusions about the effect of SMEs on growth and job creation. Developing
countries usually have a larger informal sector, and most of SMEs are out of necessity with
lower productivity and compete in crowded markets (Deijl et al. 2013). A study conducted
by World Bank in 2010 covering 132 countries has found that SMEs in high-income
countries employ a higher percentage of the workforce. In half of high-income economies

1

Exports data not included for UAE and Jordan.
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surveyed, formal SMEs employ at least 45% of the workforce compared to 27% only in
low-income economies. The low ratios of SMEs' employment to total employment in lowincome economies can be explained by the larger size of the informal sector (Kushnir et
al. 2010). This highlights the importance of SMEs in economic development and provision
of jobs. As for Saudi Arabia, the SME sector is still inefficient in terms of creating jobs for
citizens in the private sector. Saudi workers did not exceed 18 percent of total employment
for the last decade and the rest of jobs in the sector are occupied by expatriates. Therefore,
it can be concluded that current status of SMEs sector is inefficient in terms of generating
employment and this is due to many reasons that are directly related to the history of the
country, investment culture, educational outcomes, and government policies. Most Saudi
SMEs are concentered in low-value-added activities like trade and construction with low
qualifications needed for the related jobs which resulted in the high recruitment of foreign
labor for lower wages. Moreover, the educational outcomes are unbalanced with the
country’s intention to move towards more industrialized and productive economy and less
reliance on natural resources like oil and minerals. Saudi Arabia suffers from a shortage of
Saudi skilled labor and one reason is attributable to the inefficient outcomes of the
educational system are not satisfactory in terms of responding to the scientific and
technological demand of the labor market. Moreover, reforms should focus more on
vocational and training education rather than university level education to create more jobs
in the SME sector and reduce reliance on unskilled foreign labor (Achoui 2009).
Government interventions and policies like Saudization to generate more jobs in SMEs
sector for citizens was a marginal success. In most cases, Saudization policy had an adverse
effect on SMEs overall productivity where most SMEs would hire Saudis just to avoid
8

sanctions and some SMEs informally paid random citizens in exchange of registering their
name as employees to meet the legal requirement of Saudization. Although government
intervention might encourage companies to hire more citizens, but it is not creating
incentives for SMEs to invest high value-added activities that could create permanent
employment opportunities. (Al Baker 2015).
2.4 Financing Small and Medium Enterprises: The Finance Gap
The SME sector and its important role in the economic growth and development
process continue to be the forefront of policy debates and has attracted the interest from
academics and policy-makers across the globe. In general, the crucial importance of SMEs
sector is stemming from its claimed role in facilitating the economic growth and
development process. Advocates argue that SMEs encourage entrepreneurship and
enhance competition, therefore, have benefits on economy-wide efficiency, innovation,
and aggregate productivity growth. It is frequently being claimed that SMEs, in general,
are more flexible in responding to market changes and more productive than large firms.
Also, SMEs expansion can have an immediate impact on employment generation because
they are more labor-intensive (Ganbold 2008). However, the SME ability to grow and
expand depends highly on their potential investment in restructuring, technology, and
human capital. In spite of the consensus on SMEs importance, they are significantly more
financially constrained especially in developing countries. It is assumed that SMEs face a
higher cost of external credits where financial institutions (e.g. banks) are less willing to
lend to SMEs due to the higher credit risk, information asymmetry and lack of trading
history (Abdulsaleh et al. 2013). Other SMEs are involuntarily excluded from access to
9

finance in cases where enterprises are not making enough returns or are unable to provide
the guarantees required by capital suppliers which increase their credit risk (Angela, 2011).
2.4.1 Internal Finance
It is claimed that SMEs in their early phases rely heavily on internal sources such
as retained profits, personal savings, family and friends. SMEs start to gradually adjust
their capital structure as they advance through their business lifecycle. During subsequent
growth stages, SMEs start to establish track record which improves their creditworthiness
and information transparency and therefore higher chances to access external finance like
banks loans (Berger et al, 1998). According to the growth lifecycle model, researchers2
have found empirical evidence that SMEs financial behavior is, to a large extent, attributed
to the life-cycle pattern which was consistent over time and similar across different
industries. However, others have critiqued the growth life-cycle model that it does not offer
a clear picture of SMEs financial behavior. Moreover, the lifecycle paradigm is not
applicable to all SMEs operating in different industries where firm size, age and
information availability, which are intended to constitute the backbone of this paradigm,
are not perfectly correlated. Gregory et al. (2005) partially agreed with growth life cycle
model stating that SMEs financing cannot be standardized. Also, their results showed that
only firm's size was a significant predictor of the capital structure decision in SMEs. The
Peaking Order theory developed by Myers (1984) suggest that the capital structure decision
is a function of the firms' age. In this theory, internal sources of funds are prioritized and
the use of external sources is delayed until internal ones are exhausted. Helwege and Liang

2

Kimhi (1997), Barton and Gordon (1987), La Rocca et al. (2011) and Wu et al. (2008)
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(1996) have tested the theory by observing the financial decisions of a sample of SMEs
over eight years and did not observe any significant relationship between resorting to
external sources of finance and a deficit in internal sources (Abdulsaleh et al 2013).
2.4.2 External Finance
A massive amount of literature on enterprise finance, and to a large extent, agree
that SMEs in both developing and developed world are more restricted in access to external
sources of funds. External sources in the form of debt financing including but not limited
to bank loans, equity finance, government funding and venture capital. However, SMEs
face more barriers in access to such resources because SMEs are perceived as high risk for
lenders. Agency problems, lack of trade history, lack of risk management skills and knowhow, and lack of collateral are reasons behind the reluctance of lending institutions to lend
to SMEs, especially micro and small enterprises.
2.4.2.1 Equity Financing
As agency problems and information asymmetry are considered to be more severe
in the early stages of SMEs, internal equity financing is a critical source of finance. As
SMEs at early stages suffer from cash shortage and lack of collateral, unlike debt, equity
offers long-term finance with minimum cash outflow in the form of interest. Also, equity
capital can enhance small firms credibility by indicating that the firm has the approval of
sophisticated financial professionals (Ou & Haynes, 2006). A contrary argument is that
SMEs at funding stage may not choose to use equity to avoid dilution s of ownership of
their firms (Reid, 1996; Berger et al. 1998)
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2.4.2.2 Venture Capital
Venture capitalists are financial intermediaries. Venture capital is a form of finance
in which funds are raised from investors and redistributed by investing in high-risk firms
that are mostly small or start-up enterprises3. Venture capital market includes a variety of
organizations, including public corporations, small business investment corporations and
private limited partnerships. However, using venture capital as a source of funds for SMEs,
venture capitalists face significant adverse selection and moral hazard problems (Smolarski
& Kut, 2011). This result from the relationship between the venture capitalists and
entrepreneur where the latter lack information or skills to use the funds optimally. To
reduce such uncertainty, Gompers (1995) emphasized on three control mechanisms. the
use of convertible securities which, unlike debt or equity, could mitigate agency problems
through an incentive-compatible contract that allows the owner some control during the
investment period (Bascha & Walz 2001). The syndication of investment is another
common control strategy in venture capital to reduce adverse selection problem through
the participation of co-investor sharing the investment risk. The staging of capital infusion
is a main characteristic of venture capital. Venture capitalists invest in stages to maintain
control over financed projects and reduce problems that can occur as a result of information
asymmetry. Gompers (1995) provided evidence that staged financing allows venture
capitalists to gather information before making a decision on reinvestment and an exit
mechanism if any undesirable information regarding the investment emerges (Abdulsaleh
et al. 2013).

3

Potter & Porto (2007); Daskalakis et al. (2013)
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2.4.2.3 Bank Financing
A large body of the literature demonstrated that bank loans are the main external
source of funds of SMEs in both developed and developing countries. From banks'
perspective, SMEs segment has great potentials of profitability and frequently viewed as
unsaturated sector with good prospects which explain their engagement in financing SMEs.
Banks do not only offer necessary capital for entrepreneurs to start a new business or
expand current ones, but they also offer a wide range of financial services and products.
Banks involvement with funding SMEs is also driven by the intense competition in other
sectors such as the large business and retail customers (Beck, et al. 2008). However, in
order to reduce the risks that are usually associated with lending to SMEs, banks adopt
some mechanisms such as relationship lending, scoring, and other techniques. Under
relationship lending, ‘soft' information is collected by banks through contact with SMEs to
evaluate the creditworthiness of the entrepreneur and to ensure that the potential loan will
be repaid. Relationship lending has been found to have a positive effect on the availability
of funds for SMEs (e.g., Petersen & Rajan, 1994). Evidence from the literature also shows
that a trust-based relationship lending includes other benefits like a lower cost of credit and
protection against credit crunches (Berger et al, 1998).
Scoring is another lending technique based on ‘hard’ quantitative information used
by banks to evaluate loans applications that lack information on the creditworthiness of the
applicants, i.e. entrepreneurs. Unlike in relationship lending, information required for
credit scoring are readily available, usually from consumer and commercial credits
bureaus. Evidence from the literature showed that credit scoring increases the availability
13

of funds for SMEs. Other evidence showed that the portfolio share of SMEs has increased
in banks who adopted credit scoring technique (e.g. Frame et al. 2001).
2.5 SMEs Finance Gap in Saudi Arabia
The results of a research conducted by Beck et al. (2008) that included a survey
covering 45 countries4 to investigate and provide measures of the extent of banks lending
to SMEs show that most banks are showing an increasing interest in SMEs and viewed
SMEs as attractive and profitable businesses. However, the research also show that SMEs
are still significantly financially constrained and the SME market is still far from saturated.
In an enterprise-level survey jointly conducted by World Bank to investigate the status of
banking lending to SMEs around the world, the results suggest that lending practices to
SMEs are particularly relevant in MENA5 region. SMEs in the MENA region are more
financially constrained where only 20 percent of SMEs have loans or line of credit and
only 10 percent of their investment expenditure is financed by bank loans. A further
investigation6 of SMEs bank lending in MENA region showed that oil economies (i.e.
GCC) recorded the lowest share of SMEs lending with 2 percent comparing to 13 percent
for non-GCC. Low share of SMEs lending in GCC is explained by the domination of large
enterprises with small non-oil sector. Moreover, GCC has smaller population and nationals
who tend to prefer job security in the public sector rather than taking risks in SMEs sector.
However, the large difference between actual SMEs lending and the long-term target of
4

The sample included 38 developing countries and 7 developed countries.

5

MENA: Middle East and North Africa.

6

A survey jointly conducted by World Bank and (UAB) Union of Arab Banks which has 330 bank
members.
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the respondents suggests a substantial room for more SMEs lending. SMEs lending targets
were significantly lower in GCC which implies that there are ‘natural' limits to SMEs

1%
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2%
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4%
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10%

13%

15%

16%

20%

24%

profitability in oil-economies (Rocha et al. 2011).

Figure 2: SMEs Loans/Total Loans in MENA Region
Source: World Bank & Arab Union Banks

Therefore, to overcome the obstacles of access to finance facing SMEs,
strengthening credit information and creditors rights should be a priority item in
governments’ regulatory agenda (Rocha et al, 2011). A credit guarantee scheme program
(Kafalah) was established to overcome the issue of bank lending to SMEs in Saudi Arabia.
The program aims to promote financing to SMEs; under this program banks offer finance
to SMEs up to SAR 2 million and the Kafalah program issues a guarantee to the bank
covering up to 80 percent of the financing amount. However, Saudi Arabia is still one of
the few countries in the MENA region that their credit guarantee programs do not offer
assistance to participating enterprises. Despite the objectives of the program are explicitly
stated to improve SMEs’ lending know-how, capacity building is not offered. Capacity
building is argued to have a positive externality on guarantee schemes through the
provision of assistance to SMEs in areas such as risk management, accounting, and
15

marketing. In Saudi Arabia, SMEs bank lending represents only 5 percent of total finance
and the credit scheme program Kafalah is still inefficient due to issues related to the
regulatory framework of the program (SMEA).
2.6 Islamic Finance Introduction
2.6.1 Overview of Islamic Banking
Islamic finance was used predominantly in the Muslim world and its practice dates
back to a classical period. However, the term ‘Islamic financial system' is relatively new
appearing in the late 1970s and it is defined as a banking system whose principle underlying
its operations and activities are founded on Sharia (Islamic laws). The Islamic financial
system is not limited to banking but extends to capital markets, capital formation and all
types of financial intermediation. The Islamic financial system is expected to go beyond
the narrow concept of being ‘interest-free' system and actively participate in achieving the
goals and objective of Islamic economy. Although Islamic finance is founded on the
absolute prohibition of Riba (usury), it is supported by other principles of Islamic doctrine
advocating risk-sharing and entrepreneurship and absolute prohibition of Gharar
(preventable uncertainty and ambiguity) Maysir (gambling and other speculative
behavior). Earning a passive return on capital is prohibited because of the Islamic
perception of hoarding capital as it prevents money from realizing its intended objectives
and negates its function as a viable tool for development (Kayed 2012). Rather, Islamic
finance suggests profit-loss sharing (PLS) models that promote active involvement of IFIs
in economic activities and limit the conventional practice of transferring risk to the
borrowers. The rationale behind ‘no profit-sharing without risk-sharing’ is that earning
16

profits is legitimized by engaging in a real economic activity. The risk-sharing nature of
Islamic financial intermediation and, indeed, the asset-backed nature helps greatly to
promote entrepreneurship, contribute to the real sector, and minimize the speculative
transactions and excessive risk-taking behaviors by economic agents. The conventional
system focuses mainly on the economic and financial aspect of transactions and mostly
driven by profit-maximization, and intermediation services are provided on the basis of
interests rates on both assets and liabilities sides. Islamic financial intermediaries, however,
had to develop other modes through which savings are mobilized and passed on to
borrowers without payment or receipt of interest.
2.6.2 The Nature of Financing
With the absence of interest, other financial instruments that conform with Islamic
laws were developed to serve different economic purposes. Various Islamic financial
instruments are broadly classified as ‘markup-based' or ‘equity-based' and each of which
includes a verity of contracts. Markup-based can be regarded as debt-creating modes as it
provides finance in the form of debt (Alomar & Abdel-Haq 1996). Markup-based modes
include Murabaha (cost-plus sale), Ijara (leasing) or Salam (advanced payments for
goods).7 The finance-user in these modes owes back a predetermined payment to the
financer, and hence it becomes in the form of debt. On the other hand, with equity-based
finance, the finance-user pays back the financer according to the profit and loss that he
makes out of the use of the finance. Two prominent equity-based instruments are
Musharaka (partnership) and Mudaraba (silent partnership) with defined profit-loss

7

Glossary.
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sharing (PLS) rules and values. The rationale of the profit-loss sharing is that return on
capital will depend on productivity, and the allocation of funds will be primarily based on
the soundness of the project (Kabir et al. 2012). Also, PLS could reduce the unjust
distribution of wealth. In PLS, the supply of money is not allowed to overstep the supply
of goods and would thus curb inflationary pressure in the economy (Zaher & Hassan 2001).
Profit-loss sharing is considered to better adjust to shocks and disruptions of payments
mechanism. In a system where predetermined interest rate is prohibited and the nominal
value of deposits (i.e. investment accounts) is not guaranteed, shocks are absorbed by
changes in the nominal value of the deposits. In PLS-based finance, investment depends
on the additional production that is reflected in the expected profitability of the project. If
the business fails to make profits, then the Islamic bank would receive much less returns;
therefore, the bank debit the amount on the investment account which means a reduction
in the value of these accounts and consequently a reduction in M3. In case the business is
successful and make profits, part of these profits are credited to the investment accounts,
consequently an increase in M3. It is important to note that there is an additional production
of real wealth. Therefore, monetary expansion through PLS is not inflationary. The same
argument cannot be made in Murabaha (cost-plus sale) were the creditworthiness of the
borrower takes priority to a project’s expected profitability in taking an investment
decision. Although Murabaha finance is linked to real asset or economic activity, but
contrary to PLS, it creates a debt the borrower has to pay back regardless of the success of
the business. Therefore, no cancellation of monetary asset takes place due to failure in
creating additional value. Moreover, it is argued that the competence and expertise of banks
in effecting PLS instruments would encourage more entrepreneurs to engage in more
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innovative businesses to take advantage of the available funds. As PLS instruments allow
banks to contribute to management and supervision of the business, banks have the
opportunity to evaluate business proposals, thus enter into partnership contracts where
prospects seem promising.
Islamic Financial Instruments
Markup-Based
Murabaha

Salam

Equity-Based
Ijara

Mudaraba

Musharaka

Diminshing
Musharaka

Figure 3: Islamic Financial Instruments

2.7 Profit-Loss Sharing to Finance Small and Medium Enterprises
There is a substantial evidence in the literature that small and medium enterprises
are more financially-constrained than larger enterprises. Financial intermediaries (i.e.
banks) are expected to be one of the main providers of funds to SMEs in a similar way they
provide funds to other customer categories (Shaban et al. 2016). However, SMEs owners
usually face a higher cost in access to external funds in the form of interests and collateral
requirement. They usually fail to meet the stringent credits requirements of conventional
banks. A number of factors including information asymmetry, lack of trade history and
lack of collateral increase the risk of lending to SMEs, hindering banks’ willingness to lend
to SMEs. To alleviate the finance issue facing SMEs, diverse and innovative sources of
finance can be examined; one possibility is to identify potentials and limitations of
participatory models of Islamic finance. Profit-loss sharing (PLS) contracts, is a possible
solution to finance SMEs by allowing the entrepreneurs to share, rather than to bear, the
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risk of starting a new business or expanding existing ones (Kayed 2012). It is argued that
Islamic participatory approaches could have huge economic potentials for SMEs if
genuinely undertaken. In partnership contracts, the Islamic financial intermediary (IFI) and
the entrepreneur contribute capital into the business; thus, both parties share the risk and
the rewards associated with entrepreneurial activity. Moreover, considering the objectives
of Islamic finance, IFIs are under religious and moral obligation to actively participate
towards the nations' welfare and prosperity through the promotion of entrepreneurship and
funding the creation of new enterprises. According to Kayed (2012):
A vast majority of Islamic finance scholars view IFIs as uniquely positioned
to deliver significant contribution towards the establishment of an
indigenous economic structure capable of expanding the productive base of
the economies of various Islamic countries through the creation of a
dynamic entrepreneurship sector. An honest application of PLS contracts
can facilitate the development of entrepreneurship; thus, boost the growth
birth rate of new SMEs.

2.7.1 Mudaraba (Silent Partnership)
Mudaraba is a form of partnership where one party provide the funds, and the other
provides the expertise and management (Alomar & Abdel-Haq 1997). It is a model similar
to conventional asset management where asset managers invest on behalf of capital
providers and receive a percentage of the realized profits for their services. However, in
the case of Mudaraba, the manager is not compensated through management fee and his
only return would be generated in the case profitability is achieved. Mudaraba can be
restricted where the capital provider can define clear guidelines for the use of capital and
risk exposure or it can be unrestricted where the capital provider allows the Mudarib (the
manager) to manage the capital with no restrictions. In Mudaraba contract, the profits are
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distributed according to predetermined ratios and the losses, if any, are borne entirely by
the capital provider. However, if the loss is due to the negligence of the entrepreneur, he
may be held responsible for the financial loss incurred (Zaher & Hassan 2001). Invested
capital in both contracts, Mudaraba and Musharaka, will be transformed to debt in case of
proven negligence of the managing partner, i.e. entrepreneur. (Febianto et al. 2007).
Mudaraba could be a favorable option for SMEs where the entrepreneur has complete
ownership and management rights over the business, and the risk is transferred to the
capital provider. Unlike venture funds, the investor has no management rights and is not
allowed to intervene in the affairs of the business. However, Islamic banks reluctance to
offer Mudaraba to finance SMEs is understandable where this contract is too risky for the
bank. Islamic banks while having no management rights over the business, it stands to lose
its entire capital contribution, therefore, they cannot afford to be “sleeping partner”.
2.7.2 Musharaka (Partnership)
Musharaka is a financing technique adopted by IFIs. It is an agreement under which
the IFI provides funds that are pooled with funds contributed by entrepreneur and others.
In Musharaka contract, both partners are entitled to participate in the management of the
enterprise but not necessarily required to do so. Profits are shared according to prenegotiated ratios and loss is distributed in proportion to each partner share of capital (Iqbal
& Llewellyn 2002). Musharaka contract is more preferred to IFIs than Mudaraba because
it exposes the entrepreneur to capital risk; hence, the entrepreneur has a stronger motive to
be cautious with managing the business venture and therefore put forth more efforts to
ensure its success. Musharaka contract allows IFIs to effectively participate in management
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and supervision over funded business ventures. Musharaka is considered to be the most
authentic PLS instrument and less risky than Mudaraba. It is more suitable for the
entrepreneur who prefers to share the risks that are generally associated with start-ups.
Moreover, it contributes to the creation and the expansion of productive businesses; thus,
it entails real economic activity and goes beyond sharia-compliance to contribute to socioeconomic wellbeing (Kayed 2012). Unlike conventional interest-based finance, Musharaka
is fair for both the financer (IFI) and to the entrepreneur; if the business venture rate of
returns turns to be higher than the ongoing interest rate, then fixed arrangement would not
be fair to the financer. If the business venture fails, the entrepreneur bears the loss alone,
and the financer unfairly recover which is deemed unjust; therefore, explicitly prohibited
in Islam.
2.7.3 Musharaka Mutanaqisah (Decreasing Partnership)
Decreasing partnership (also called Diminishing Musharaka) is an innovative
Islamic financial instrument, arguably is capable of overcoming the shortcomings of
Musharaka which are mainly the high equity risk, and whether it is practical for IFIs to
remain an active partner in a numerous number of assorted businesses without making farreaching compromises (Kayed 2012). The main advantage for IFIs is claimed to be that
decreasing partnership provide them with a clear exit and liquidation mechanism.
Decreasing partnership could be beneficial to SMEs owners who are underserved by
financial institutions but unwilling to give up ownership of their businesses. A number of
researchers have presented decreasing partnership as the most suitable modern financing
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technique and could be a viable tool in facilitating SMEs access to finance and acquirement
of necessary assets (Ahmed 2002; Sadique 2008).
2.7.3.1 Decreasing Partnership for Asset Purchase
IFIs could contribute significantly to reducing the finance gap facing SMEs through
the application of decreasing partnership to facilitate the acquirement of assets. Decreasing
partnership offers a higher degree of comfort and flexibility for both the IFI and the client
that would not be possible using fixed price mechanisms such Murabaha (cost-plus sale).
The degree of flexibility is attributed to the incorporation of the Ijara (leasing) contract
that could allow delays in meeting periodical payments without loss of revenues for the
IFI, and a greater level of ease to the SME owner as he is granted freedom to manage
liquidity (Obaidullah et al. 2008).
Mechanism
For SMEs owners who seek funds through Islamic banks to acquire or develop
assets, decreasing partnership can be applied in which a joint purchase of an asset by
Islamic bank and the client takes place. In decreasing partnership, each partner share is his
contribution to the capital. Therefore, the down payment is the client share, and the
financing amount is the banks share. After the initial purchase, the bank share will be
divided into equal units, and the client is required to purchase the shares of the bank at
equal intervals, thus reducing the banks share and increasing the client share until the whole
asset is owned by the client. The price of each unit is usually fixed beforehand. If the asset
purchased is for utility buildings and machinery, then the bank share would be leased to
the client under a separate Ijara (lease) agreement after which the client would be allowed
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to use the asset in question. The client will gradually own a larger share of the asset while
the bank share decreases due to periodic purchases by the client; as a result, adjustments to
the leasing rentals becomes necessary to reflect the reduced ownership of the bank. In
assets acquirement, the legal title is usually transferred from the original owner to the client
directly. In assets acquirement, ownership (i.e. legal title) is usually transferred from the
original owner to the client directly while the bank's involvement is limited to its financial
interest. Under decreasing partnership both the bank and the client are co-owners of the
assets, therefore, the client is appointed as the bank’s agent to make the purchase of the
asset and hold its legal title. Although ownership of the asset rests solely with the client,
he is only considered the owner of part of the asset; that is to the extent of his initial
participation in the cost of the purchase. In order to protect the bank’s interest under
decreasing partnership, a legal mortgage is drawn over the asset in favor of the bank. This
document reflects the bank position as mortgagee who is entitled to monetary dues from
the mortgagor and its applicability would be limited to the share owned by the client, that
is mortgaged to the bank for securing the Ijara rentals and actual losses due to possible
non-adherence to the promise of purchase (Obaidullah et al. 2008). In the case of default,
the bank would have reasonable grounds to liquidate the mortgage. However, if the
mortgage is liquidated, the bank is only entitled to recover actual loss suffered due to
client’s default along with Ijara rentals for the remaining share of the bank. Any balance
remaining of the sale price of the client share should be given to him.
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2.7.3.2 Decreasing Partnership for Venture Capital
Arguably, decreasing partnership is also applicable to finance ventures and could
be a useful tool to finance SMEs with distinct advantages for both the financer and the
entrepreneur. In addition to sharing unlimited profits due to profit-loss sharing scheme, if
the venture becomes successful the bank could expect to make considerable revenues by
selling their share to the client where the price would be based on market value. As the
bank is considered co-owner under decreasing partnership, a major advantage for the bank
lies in the possibility of effectively contributing to the management of SMEs and
monitoring their progress. The joint equity participation could be beneficial for both the
bank and the entrepreneur. It enables banks to make smooth withdrawals while making
gain through the sale of its share to the client and dividends. SME could benefit from jointequity as well where it would facilitate enhancing capital base and cash position without
placing an unnecessary burden on SMEs in the form interest payments. SMEs could benefit
from expertise extended by the bank as well as the ability to gradually gain complete
ownership by buying the bank share through SMEs' revenues (Obaidullah et al. 2008).

2.8 Profit-Loss Sharing Instruments: Ideal vs. Reality
Profit-Loss sharing (PLS) dominates the theoretical literature of Islamic finance
and this emphasis on the principle of PLS stems from the Islamic ban on interest. However,
IFIs today are seen to diverge in important ways from intellectual doctrines underpinning
their role in the economy (Abozaid & Dusuki 2007). In theory, many Islamic economists8
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Siddiqi (1983, 1985, 2001); Chapra (2000) Ahmad (1984;2000) and others.
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favor PLS instruments with respect to financial intermediation and placed a greater
emphasis on the social and religious responsibility of IFIs towards promoting economic
development and securing more equitable distribution of income. Further, many of these
economists have argued that PLS-based finance inevitably promotes small and medium
enterprises with the elimination of interests and collateral requirement. However, the actual
practice of IFIs is so far away from the principles of PLS. Almost all IFIs worldwide resort
to fixed rate of retunes techniques or debt-like instruments. Although Islamic economists
do not fully negate the use of permissible debt-like instruments, many have observed that
the use of PLS-based instrument has declined to almost negligible proportions (Iqbal &
Molyneux 2005; Yousef 2004).

Figure 4: The Structure of Financing Modes in Islamic Banks 2012
Source: Islamic Development Bank
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In many Islamic banks’ asset portfolios, Murabaha (cost-plus sale) account for the
great bulk of their investments (Abozaid & Dusuki 2007). Islamic financial institutions
tend utilize risk-free instruments in the provision of external finance such as Murabaha
where the latter represent 70 to 90 percent of total funding activities in IFIs (Muhammad
2010; Khalaf 20119; Ali 2014). In some countries, PLS-based finance is not offered.
Islamic banks, regardless of their degree of success, have failed to adopt PLS-based finance
in their business. Islamic Development Bank (IDB) has not used PLS-based finance so far
except for few projects which account for only one percent of total funded projects. Thus,
negating the developmental role that IFIs aims to render Muslim communities at large.
2.9 Implication of Agency Problem in Islamic contracts
A thorough examination of the current practices of Islamic banks will prove it is
not so ‘Islamic’ after all, particularly their heavy reliance on debt-like instruments which
still constitute the overwhelming majority of their operations, and their financial products
are considered as ‘concealed’ versions of conventional ones. The only difference is found
in the technicalities and legal forms, but the substance is the same. There is a lot of
controversy over the current practice of Islamic banks, perhaps one of the plausible reasons
why the ideal “Islamic banking” has not been materialized is due to the absence of political
will in the Muslim world to establish real Islamic economics (Abozaid & Dusuki 2007).
On the other hand, the proponents of the current practice of Islamic banks argue that the
reason behind allowing banks to practice what is considered to be “controversial” contracts
is necessary to facilitate their development and to ensure their stability under the high
9

largely based on limited secondary data
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competition with conventional banks and the interest-based economic system. However,
other Islamic economists argued that studies related to SMEs and the role of Islamic
finance and challenges associated with it were not given much attention. Despite evidence
in the literature that Islamic banks showed more resilience in the last financial crisis which
negatively affected conventional sources of funds available for SMEs, the proposed
alternative of Islamic finance was never given enough investigation to determine its
capability and readability to replace conventional financing for SMEs (Ali, 2014).
Therefore, understanding the reasons behind the lack of PLS-based finance and the
disproportionate reliance on debt-like finance is useful. This heavy reliance on debt-like
instruments primarily Murabaha led several economists to refer to it as “the Murabaha
Syndrome”, and subsequent studies have explained the causes behind this phenomenon.
However, the most predominant among these explanations are agency problems resulting
from asymmetry of information which made the application of PLS financing less efficient
in practice (Khan, 1995). Moral hazard and adverse selection are argued to worsen in
developing countries due to added problems (Lynn, 1998). One problem facing Islamic
banks is that PLS contracts require well-defined property rights to function properly,
however, in most Muslim countries property rights are not properly protected (Presley et
al. 2000). Moreover, the structure of Islamic banks itself hinders the application of PLS
modes of finance. Islamic banks investment accounts are based on PLS, which means no
fixed return is guaranteed on these accounts. Depositors are generally risk-averse,
therefore, Islamic banks become risk-averse as well. Thus, even with good investments
opportunities, depositors might not be willing to take the risk. Also, there are few credible
institutional infrastructures to conduct common monitoring and to share information of
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credit rating on borrowers. This informational asymmetry made Islamic banks more
reluctant to utilize PLS instruments (Febianto et al. 2007).

2.9.1 Adverse Selection & Moral Hazard in Profit-Loss Sharing
Several studies exploring the application of profit-loss sharing finance have
identified the moral hazard and adverse selection as the main reasons behind its
unpopularity. Proponents of Islamic banking aspire to have a balanced mix between
markup and PLS modes of finance (Ahmed, 2002). In regards to financing small and
medium enterprises, it is argued that there is a dichotomy of preferences of enterprises and
IFIs. Medium and large enterprises have more solid asset base and more experience in risk
management and would prefer markup-based modes of finance, whereas smaller
enterprises with fewer assets and being risker would prefer to spread the risk through PLS
modes of finance. Islamic banks, on the other hand, prefer to fund smaller and risker
enterprises through fixed markup-modes and would be more comfortable funding medium
and large enterprises through PLS-modes.
Islamic banks are more vulnerable to agency problems in profit-loss sharing
contracts. They face difficulties resulting from limited ex-ante information on projects'
quality and profitability. Entrepreneurs who expect their business to provide high nonmonetary benefits but low realized profits would seek PLS to enjoy high total return at an
artificially low cost of capital (Pryor, 1985). Likewise, Islamic banks under PLS would
attract entrepreneurs with risker businesses, and borrowers who inflate their expected
profits in the hope of being quoted lower profit-sharing ratio by the bank (Nienhaus, 1983).
Other difficulties arise from ex-post information where entrepreneurs might have the
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incentive to underreport profits or artificially reduce profits either by blatant fraud or
legally through increasing the non-pecuniary rewards (e.g. extra leisure). Hence, the
Islamic bank will have to engage in a costly monitoring process. According to Iqbal and
Molyneux (2005), the problem of moral hazard in the context of applying PLS modes is
overstated. They agree that agency problems make PLS modes less attractive, but they do
not believe such problems are unique to PLS modes and are similar to those arising in any
equity contract in the conventional system.
There are practical reasons for Islamic banks and entrepreneurs not to prefer PLS
contracts as well. Under Mudaraba, it is difficult for the entrepreneur to expand the
business due to the limited opportunities to re-invest retained earnings, and under
Musharaka he cannot be the sole owner of his business except through decreasing
partnership which may take a long time (Farooq, 2007). The structure of deposits in Islamic
banks is not sufficiently long term, therefore, they do not want to get involved in long-term
projects. Moreover, PLS modes require a lot of information about the entrepreneurial
abilities of the borrower which are not easily available. Also, Islamic banks have to closely
monitor the businesses under PLS contracts which increase the cost of such contracts.
Islamic banks in PLS contracts will engage in additional dead-weight cost in terms of
gathering information, monitoring cost and reduced work incentives for entrepreneurs
which would make Islamic banks uncompetitive with conventional banks rivals (Sarker,
1999).

30

2.10 Welfare Implication and Efficiency
Profit-loss sharing dominates the literature as the only model that reflects the true
spirit of Islamic finance. Many proponents of Islamic finance argued for Islamic finance,
(e.g. Chapra 1985) as a more just financial system which places an emphasis on social
welfare and distribution of wealth. Therefore, profit-loss sharing should be available and
finely interwoven within the financial system to increase access to finance to capture some
of the potential benefits of SMEs such as providing more self-employment, adequate
production and distribution of goods and service that meet local needs or exports. Others
have provided a critique of the conventional system from an Islamic perspective, (e.g.
Algaoud & Lewis, 2007). However, these claims are not accompanied by rigorous
theoretical modeling. An exception is (Haque & Mirakhor, 1986) who formulated
investment behavior in profit-loss sharing system and investigated related problems (i.e.
agency problems). Their paper shows that PLS contracts can be designed to take into
account the moral hazard problem that arises from asymmetric information on profits.
Their analysis also shows that there is no strong theoretical reason to support the priori
assertion that if profit-loss sharing system is adopted investment would decline, but they
demonstrate the importance of legal and institutional framework that facilitates contracting
to avoid adverse effect on investment. Another exception is (Hasan 1985) who analytically
showed that PLS financing is more profitable to financers in the long-run than interest rate
financing. However, a legal and institutional framework for PLS models to work efficiently
is not fully adopted in countries where Islamic banks operate (Sugema et al. 2010). In the
absence of such framework, monitoring cost could prohibit an honest application of the
profit-sharing system. The next chapter provides a detailed explanation for why Islamic
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banks tend to avoid profit-loss sharing arrangements. The agency theory provides insights
into the agency-contractual problems arising from profit-loss sharing contracts, and how
other factors add more constraints on Islamic banks in adopting such arrangement.
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Chapter 3: Agency Theory and Profit-Loss Sharing Model
3.1

Introduction
Profit-loss sharing (PLS) model dominates the theoretical literature of Islamic

finance with a great emphasis on its distinct features of rewards-risk sharing, finance being
linked to actual economic activities, and other features that make PLS modes of finance
more advantageous in comparison with debt-based ones. In the literature, PLS are the only
modes that are claimed to reflect the true spirit of Islamic finance which focuses more on
the social responsibility of financial intermediaries towards the promotion of
entrepreneurship and the financial inclusion of the poor and unbanked segment of the
society. However, the current practice of IFIs has failed to integrate PLS modes and it is
mostly based on debt-like finance which led to major criticisms for the overuse of what are
thought to be controversial contracts such as Murabaha (cost plus sale) and the absence of
risk-sharing component. Many economists have examined the current practice of IFIs,
reasons behind the unpopularity of PLS instruments, and how their application remain
challenging at a practical level. As discussed in the literature review section, the lack of
PLS within IFIs has been mainly attributed, among other reasons, to agency problems that
are prevalent in PLS contracts as a result of asymmetry of information.
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3.2

Agency Theory
The agency theory extends on the risk-sharing literature to include so-called

“agency” problems that arise in the principal-agent relationship as a result of a divergence
of goals, interests, and division of labor. Agency theory is mostly directed at relationships
in which one party act on behalf of another, that is when one party, the principal, delegate
work or management rights to another party, the agent (e.g., profit-loss sharing contracts).
When both, principal and agent, are assumed to be utility maximizers, then the agent has
an incentive not to act in the principal’s best interest. Agency problems arise as a result of
a conflict of interests or when the principal is prohibited by resources to verify if the agent
is acting in the principal’s best interest. The principal could limit conflict of interest by
creating appropriate incentives to induce the agents to act in a way that maximizes the
principal’s utility or by incurring monitoring cost to limit agent’s aberrant behavior (Jensen
and Meckling 1976). Another problem is when the principal and agent have different levels
of risk-aversion; thus, each might prefer to act differently in dealing with risks.
The main focus of agency theory is to develop the most efficient contract to govern
the principal-agent relationship given assumptions about people (e.g., risk-aversion, selfinterest), organizations (conflict of goals) and information (Eisenhardt, 1989). However,
contracts cannot be written at no cost and monitoring of ex post behavior can be costly.
Therefore, the structure of the contract is crucial to combat adverse selection and moral
hazards that are mainly a result of asymmetry of information. In the context of the contract
theory, there are two primary approaches to establish the optimal contract; complete and
incomplete contracts. The complete contract is more concerned with choosing the optimal
contract, “behavior-based” vs. “outcome-based”, and places more emphasis on ex ante
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stage. The behavior-based contract aims to limit divergence of interests by controlling the
agent behavior in accordance to pre-agreed terms and restrictions stipulated in the contract.
This contract is feasible if the principal is able to monitor and verify the agent behavior,
surely at a cost. However, if the principal cannot observe the agent behavior or it costly to
do so, he will try to influence the agent behavior through creating contractual incentives.
The outcome-based contract aims to indirectly influence the behavior of the agent by
creating incentives if certain milestones are achieved in an attempt to align interests and
reduce moral hazard. On the other hand, Incomplete contracts places more emphasis on ex
post control. Hart and Holmstrom (1986) argued that ex post allocation of control is what
matters to control agency problems because contracts are incomplete due to the higher
transaction cost. The contract cannot stipulate each partner’s obligation in every
contingency, and in some instances they leave out contingencies that they simply do not
anticipate. Furthermore, in the case of small businesses or startups with mostly intangible
assets, the best way to gain ex post control is through active involvement in the business
(Van Osnabrugge, 2000).

3.2.1 Agency Theory: Islamic perspective
Agency problems are considered the major obstacles facing IFIs to engage in profitloss sharing arrangements especially for startups and smaller enterprises. In several works
on agency-theoretical framework, any contractual relationship that relates two or more
parties where the agent (entrepreneur) is assigned to act on behalf and in the interest of
other principals (bank, shareholders) could contain critical agency problems. The agent is
identified as an “insider” who has more knowledge and more information about risky and
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profitable investment opportunities but lacks funds. The financers who are identified as
“outsiders” provide funds needed to undertake such investments. However, outsiders have
less information or it is highly costly for them to observe the enterprise’s cash flow and its
investments decisions. The nature of PLS contracts are said to have inherent agencycontractual problems which explains why PLS contracts represent almost negligible
proportions of Islamic banks’ portfolios. First, it is important to note that depositors’
preference for Islamic banks (e.g. investment account holders) is attributable to religious
reasons but entrepreneurs do not necessarily have the same motive and this could result in
serious moral hazard problems in PLS financial arrangements. An incentive problem could
arise in PLS contracts in which Islamic banks depend on reported cash flow where the
state-contingent final outcome is completely dependent on the skills, knowledge and the
efforts exerted by the entrepreneur. Therefore, the entrepreneur has an incentive to underreport profits or increase costs that occur as benefits or increase in utility (e.g. fringe
benefits). In this case, it is in the entrepreneur interest to increase his benefits until his
marginal utility of increased benefits equals marginal cost (Bacha, 1997). Moreover,
Islamic rules place restrictions on collateral requirements that increase the incidence of
agency problems in PLS contracts. An enterprise seeking PLS finance through an Islamic
bank for one of its projects or subsidiaries has every incentive to allocate overheads and
other costs to that particular project/subsidiary. This is because Islamic banks have claims
only on profits generated from the financed project/subsidiary, not over all the enterprise’s
assets. Also, the enterprise could resort to different accounting methods (e.g. full-costing,
transfer price) to reduce the bank’s share in profits where the profits are transferred to other
units of the enterprise. Agency problems are more severe in Mudaraba (silent partnership)
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contract and it seem to remain as Islamic banks have no legal or management rights over
the enterprise and efforts of the entrepreneur is unobservable, therefore, cannot be
contracted. Moreover, losses in Mudaraba are exclusively borne by the Islamic bank where
agent’s liability is limited to his effort, and utility gain from shirking or other non-wage
compensations only enjoyed by the agent (i.e. the entrepreneur). Another risk that restricted
the use of PLS contracts is the discretionary power of the entrepreneur in such contracts
which allows him discretion over the assets, investment decision, and control over the
distribution of cash flows. Discretionary power could lead to the entrepreneur acting in
self-interest as the bank may not be able to consistently monitor the business’ activities and
performance, and in case of Mudaraba the bank has no automatic rights to make managerial
appointments to get an insight over the business’ operations.
According to Grossman and Hart (1988), many agency problems could result from
the separation of control to management because it could result in a conflict of interests
between those who make the decisions and those who bear the losses. Moreover, It has
been argued10 that agency problems are more likely to occur, particularly overinvestment
and more consumption of perquisites when the capital is externally financed with
considerable discretion assigned to the agent (i.e. entrepreneur). In PLS contract, the agent
either has zero lability (Mudaraba) or small liability (Musharaka) with most of the finance
being provided by an outside party which create an incentive for the agent to invest in
projects with low or negative net present value and to consume more perquisites (Khalil et
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Jensen (1986), Jensen and Mackling (1976).
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al. 2002). Managers value investments because their perquisites increase with investments
even with negative net present value (Stulz, 1990).

3.2.2 Agency Problems in PLS Contracts: Evidence from Empirical Analyses
In one of the few empirical studies11 on the lack of profit-loss sharing contracts in
Islamic banks has tested, among other aspects of Mudaraba contracts, the incidence of
agency problems and issues related to monitoring and control over the businesses’
activities. The main results of the analyses showed that underreporting of profits,
variability and uncertainty of returns, banks bearing the loss and the high cost of monitoring
were the most important reasons behind Islamic banks reluctance to use PLS contracts.
However, the lack of control and the risk of low profits showed less importance. The
analyses also showed that incidence of agency problems such as overinvestment and
overconsumption of personal benefits is higher in PLS than other contracts. The risk of
unobservable effort of the agent is shown to be relatively less important for Islamic banks.
As the literature on the management and control rights in PLS contracts is a little out of
date, a complex governance structure is required for PLS contracts to work effectively and
to overcome existing agency problems. The surveyed Islamic banks considered periodic
management reports and extending help and advice on projects management to businesses
are very important to control potential agency problems, where representation in
management and direct involvement in decision-making showed relatively less
importance. All respondents asserted that the aim of applying a monitoring system in PLS
contracts is to ensure efficient allocation of resources to their most profitable use,

11

Primary data on a global sample of 52 Islamic banks.
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compliance with the terms of contracts, and validity of reported information. All findings
of the analyses are consistent with the theoretical expectations and have policy implications
for managers of Islamic banks, agents and central banks in dealing with PLS contracts
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73

Over-Investment

82

(Khalil et al. 2002).

Over-consumption of
Personal Benefits

36
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Perks
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Reduction of Efforts
(shirking)
Under-investment

Figure 5: Key variables preventing Islamic banks from Mudaraba contracts.
Source: Khalil et al (2002)

Another empirical study12 is on how informal investors in Saudi Arabia manage
risks and minimize agency problems resulting from asymmetry of information in financing
SMEs. The study intended to examine the decision-making behavior of 156 informal
investors in Saudi Arabia through the full-investment process. It is argued that using PLS
in informal market could provide insights and practical lessons for IFIs to apply such
contracts. The researchers in this study built their hypotheses on the assumption that
investors and entrepreneurs face higher search cost in the informal capital market due to
the lack of intermediary and asymmetry of information. Another assumption applied to the
research sample is that informal investors are likely to depend on referral networks and

12

Abalkhail and Presley (2002).
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dedicate all of their resources to collect information about the qualities of the
entrepreneur (e.g. track record) to control associated risks where moral hazard could
prevent the transfer of information. There is evidence from the literature13 that informal
investors resort to co-investments to check their thinking against other knowledgeable
resources, and the willingness of other investors to invest in the same project could leads
to the investor’s decision to invest. This could also enhance the informal investors network,
provide more capital and expertise support and spread the risks. Moreover, the researchers
have tested how informal investors in Saudi Arabia control agency cost through staged
financing which is viewed in the literature14 as one of the most important mechanisms used
to control agency risks and reduce monitoring cost. Staging of finance allows investors to
reevaluate the project in each stage as they gather more information before making
refinance decision and preserve the right to abandon the project if proved unprofitable.
Moreover, investors’ interest is in high returns while entrepreneurs could have an incentive
to invest in low-value projects that provide high personal benefit. Therefore, staging of
finance protect investors against losing all of their capital and provide them an exit from
unprofitable projects. The results of researchers’ statistical analyses showed, and opposed
to the literature, that Saudi informal investors use active personal search for sources of
investments and informal business network (e.g. friends and business associates), where
formal sources (e.g. banks, chambers of commerce) are the least used. The use of informal
sources of information by Saudi investors could be due to their conservative view about

13

Aram (1989), Learner (1994).

14

Sahlman (1990), Gompers (1995).

40

agency risks and the possible conflict of interest in such market which led them to search
for entrepreneurs they personally know and can trust. In an attempt to avoid adverse
selection in the pre-investment stage, Saudi informal investors are shown to place great
importance on the personal qualities of entrepreneurs (e.g. honesty, trustworthiness), and
are more likely to invest when the entrepreneur has a good reputation as a good founder of
previous businesses. However, after a decision is made on an investment opportunity,
Saudi informal investors are shown to prefer outcome-based contracts rather than behaviorbased contracts, even with good reputation and extensive evaluation. They tend to write
comprehensive outcome-based contracts that provide incentives for entrepreneur if certain
milestones are achieved, which allows for ex post control to reduce moral hazard in the
presence of high asymmetry of information and higher cost of monitoring in informal
capital market. Saudi informal investors are shown to use co-investment to reduce the
adverse selection where 80 percent of them have frequently used co-investment and it is
mostly with people they personally know such as friends and family members while coinvestment with formal organization is less reported. The reasons to co-invest as explained
by the investors are to reduce the risks of choosing low-quality ventures, provide different
expertise to the venture and to improve their networks. The analysis also showed that
staged financing is a popular method among informal investors in Saudi Arabia to avoid
agency problems resulting from asymmetry of information. In contrast to literature that
shows informal investors (i.e. business angels) placing more emphasis on ex ante
investment and actively involved in their investee ventures, Saudi informal investors are
shown to be rarely involved in business operations and prefer other methods of monitoring
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that do not require hands-on involvement such as consultation, and reviewing periodic
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Figure 6: Use of Staged Financing and Co-investment by Saudi Informal Investors.
Source: Based on Statistical Analyses of Abalkhail and Presley (2002).

3.3

Information Sharing and Credit Reporting in Saudi Arabia
Agency problems resulting from asymmetry of information are more likely to occur

in PLS contracts which lead to less than efficient markets than those with effective
information sharing. Access to information is very important for financial markets because
it enables the lenders to overcome asymmetry information, evaluate risks more effectively
and price their financial products accordingly. Credit information is usually accessible
through Public Credit Registries (PCR) and Private Credit Bureaus (PCB). An efficient
information sharing system reduces the risks and uncertainties in the domestic credit
market which could reduce the cost of finance than would otherwise be possible. Imperfect
information could give rise to credit rationing where banks become unwilling to advance
additional funds to borrowers at the prevailing interest rate. That is, demands for loans
exceeds the supply on the interest rate quoted by the bank, and changes in interest rate
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cannot be used to clear excess demand for funds in the market15. In Saudi Arabia, one of
the main features of the financial market is credit rationing, and it is the main obstacle
facing SMEs in access to finance from banks. In one of the studies done on financing Saudi
SMEs16, only 5 percent sought finance from commercial banks while the rest used personal
sources of finance (e.g. family and friends). Moreover, only 32 percent of loans applicants
were approved for bank finance, and 78 percent of them attributed the approval to having
a personal connection with banks managers. Almost 93 percent of rejected applications
were due to lack of collateral. The high asymmetry of information in Saudi Arabia led to a
reduction in the size of finance and increased its cost. Despite the importance of
information sharing between banks on the quality and creditworthiness of borrowers, no
attempts have been made to establish public credit registry yet. All previous attempts to
establish credit bureaus were outside the banking sector, precisely by installment-selling
companies who had a strong need for credit information. Consequently, chambers of
commerce in different provinces established local credit bureaus that provide credit
information to businesses and institutions for a subscription fee. However, they were
limited to negative information only. In 1995, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency
(SAMA) established an exclusive data base for banks that worked as a “black-list” and
banks were obligated to provide information on borrowers. The data base was limited to
negative information as well. In 2002, the first and sole private credit bureau (Simah) was

15

Al-Suhaibani (2002), Dwight M. et al. (1976)

16

A sample of 200 SMEs (Sijini 1997; Al- Al-Suhaibani)
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established under the supervision of SAMA to collect and share credit information on
individuals and businesses (Al-Suhaibani 2002).
Both
(PCR and
PCB)

PCB only

PCR only

N/A Negligible

Egypt
United
Arab
Emirates

Bahrain
Kuwait
Morocco
Saudi
Arabia

Algeria/ Iran
Jordan/ Qatar
Lebanon/ Oman
Tunisia/ Palestine
Yemen

Iraq

Table 2: Public Credit Registries (PCR) and Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) in MENA Region

An efficient Information sharing system could facilitate the use of PLS contracts
and reduce the cost of finance for SMEs who need information-based finance due to their
inability to provide acceptable collateral. The weak information-sharing system in Saudi
Arabia led to the restriction of the use of PLS contracts for small businesses due to the
higher cost of monitoring and verification. Most Islamic finance for small businesses,
either through banks or other IFIs, is provided on the basis of Murabaha (cost-plus sale)
which is highly costly for entrepreneurs, especially in the case of startups. Information
sharing and credit reporting industry remain underdeveloped in Saudi Arabia and in the
MENA region as a whole due to the absence of proper legal framework and weak financial
infrastructure. An underdeveloped financial infrastructure increases the credit risk, and
thus increases the cost of finance for both lenders and borrowers. Therefore, a more
inclusive credit reporting system that includes credit information from non-banking
institutions such as trade creditors, leasing companies, and retailers is needed to reduce the
credit gap for small businesses that are usually underserved by formal financial sector and
resort to such informal sources of finance.
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Private credit bureau coverage (% of adults)
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Figure 7: Credit Information and Legal Rights
Source: World Bank (2016)

3.4

Risks Management in Profit-Loss Sharing Contracts
The practice of Islamic financial intermediation has evolved over time and made

important contributions to the development of new financial instruments and innovative
contracts that comply to Islamic laws and restrictions. This development led to the
emergence of the current model for Islamic banking, namely one-tier Mudaraba,
combined with multiple investment tools. Under this model, the relationship between the
bank and the depositors is on the basis of Mudaraba (silent partnership), however, in its
relationship with the entrepreneurs, the bank uses different modes of finance (Iqbal et al.
1998). Using one-tier Mudaraba model changes the nature of risks that face Islamic
banks because saving/investment deposits are based on PLS which means return is statecontingent and investors share the business and operational banking risks with the bank. A
brief explanation of the most important risks facing Islamic banks are presented below.
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3.4.1 Fiduciary Risk
In PLS contracts, the quality of the entrepreneur has a significant importance to
Islamic banks where the latter should extend more effort in evaluating the entrepreneur’s
risks profile before entering into PLS contact because the bank has fiduciary responsibility
as an investor of investments accounts funds. The risk profile includes, but not limited to,
past records of management, the quality of feasibility study and the human resources
involved in the business activity. In their investment appraisal, the bank should also
consider the allocation and variation of cash flows and the difficulties in executing exit
strategy. A fiduciary risk could occur where the bank is held responsible for the misconduct
of the utilization of investors’ funds. Moreover, lower returns on investment accounts could
make investors lose trust in the bank and may withdraw their deposits. Although banks
have control and management rights in case of Musharaka (partnership), an effective
contribution of the bank to management needs more than a specification of rights and
responsibilities. Moreover, a strong monitoring mechanism is yet to be devised for PLS
contracts. The high monitoring cost makes PLS contracts less preferable for Islamic banks
compared to debt-like ones which are linked to an underlying asset/good that act as
collateral, therefore, no strong monitoring is required.

3.4.2 Liquidity Risk
The liability side of Islamic banks is dominated by short-term demand deposits and
saving/investment deposits that could be withdrawn anytime. Therefore, using equity
finance implies that investments are long-term which increases the liquidity risk for banks.
Liquidity risk arise from the mismatch between maturities of the two side of balance sheet,
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either creating a surplus that needs to be invested or a shortage of cash that needs to be
funded. Liquidity could limit the bank’s ability to meet its liabilities when it falls due
(Febianto et al. 2007). This is a significant risk for Islamic banks due to the limited
availability of Sharia-compliant money market instruments and lender of last resort
(LOLR). The liquidity risk in Islamic banks is higher because they generally cannot hold
return-producing cash equivalent like conventional banks (Ariffin et al. 2009). A sale of
debt or interest-bearing loans are prohibited and cannot be used to meet liquidity
requirement. Ahmed et al. (2011) stated that the standard measures of liquidity in Islamic
banks are the liquidity gap for each maturity bucket, and the share of liquid assets to total
assets or to liquid liabilities.

3.4.3 Operational Risk
An operational risk arises form inadequate or failure of internal process, system or
due to external factors (Ahmed et al. 2001). Islamic banks are said to face higher
operational risks due the newness of their practice and other concerns like the lack of
expertise in the field and technologies that are specifically designed to Islamic financial
operations (e.g. computer software) that are generally designed for conventional use.
Moreover, Islamic banks face legal risks such as the enforceability of contracts in the
broader legal environment which is considered to be weaker in developing economies.

3.4.4 Credit Risk
Credit risk is generally defined as the possibility of the borrower failing to make
required payments on time and in accordance with the agreed terms (Febianto et al. 2007).
In PLS contracts, the Islamic banks act as a partner with entrepreneurs, therefore, there is
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a risk of the entrepreneur failing to meet his obligations in making deferred payments to
the bank. Islamic banks advance funds to the entrepreneur where the latter is responsible
for the management of the business activity which its revenues are dependent on payments
from a third party (ultimate customer). Islamic banks face higher credit risk in PLS
contracts due to the asymmetry of information where the entrepreneur could under-report
actual profits.
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Chapter 4: Venture Capital as A Model for Profit-Loss Sharing
4.1

Introduction
As discussed throughout this paper, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are

presented in the literature as an important factor for economic growth and development in
both developed and developing world. Most governments around the globe recognize that
smaller firms face more problems and barriers to entry than larger firms and have taken
steps to provide assistance, particularly with access to finance. However, SMEs in Saudi
Arabia face significant barriers to access credits because banks generally view them as
higher risk, and due to lack of tangible collateral. Profit-loss sharing finance has been
presented as an appropriate mode of finance for SMEs because it reduces the cost of capital
and eliminate the collateral requirement. However, for reasons discussed throughout this
research, Islamic banks prefer to use PLS arrangement only for high net-worth companies
that have well-established track records and are able to provide the required collateral. As
a consequence, Islamic banks became highly reliant on short-term markup-based finance
on the asset side which created a sort of disintermediation, lack of long-term finance, and
involuntary exclusion of small businesses. This means many viable and innovative
businesses go unfunded. The central idea of this section is to represent an alternative
finance for SMEs who are excluded from traditional financial institutions and regulated
capital markets. In the literature of Islamic finance, venture capital is considered a ‘natural
fit’ to profit-loss sharing models and the practice of conventional venture capital conforms
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to Islamic restrictions on investments. There are few aspects related to the structuring of
contracts and selection of financial instruments that are unacceptable; however, they can
be easily adjusted. The Islamic restrictions and the Sharia-compliant alternatives are to be
discussed later in this section.
4.2

Venture Capital
Venture capital (VC) is finance provided by financial intermediary to finance and

support high-risk ventures who cannot access funds from traditional financial institutions,
especially start-ups that usually lack an established track record and acceptable collateral.
Venture-backed firms are characterized with high-growth potentials; however, revenues
and recovery of capital are not guaranteed in such investments. Venture capital, typically
a long-term investment, takes the form of partnership in which investors act as general
partners who provide funds for high-risk startups or existing firms in exchange of private
equity, and they participate in management and investment decisions of the investee firms.
After the investment is sold, investors including general and limited partners recover the
initial capital invested plus profits. Venture capital has been associated with financing
startups and smaller businesses with high risk, mostly innovative ones; thus, investors
carefully examine the economic feasibility of potential investments. The primary goal of
the risk analysis is to identify and to measure the risk to ensure that the investors will
receive an appropriate compensation (i.e. risk premium) for the amount of risk they are
exposed to. Investors in venture capital include governmental agencies, private companies,
commercial and investment banks, insurance companies and pension funds. These
institutions invest in ventures either directly or through venture capital funds that are
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typically managed by specialized VC firms who help identify promising business
opportunities, provide finance and non-financial assistance and know-how. Entrepreneurs
with novel ideas cannot tap the equity market as well due to the high cost of initial public
offering and failure to comply to its terms and conditions. Although venture capital firms
invest in businesses of all sizes and in different sectors, it is generally associated with
ventures in the early stages, mostly growth-oriented technology-based ventures.17
Moreover, venture capitalists’ role is not limited to the provision of finance but it extends
to provide low-cost training services, technical support and business consulting to increase
ventures’ productivity and profitability. Venture capitalist generally seek to multiply their
profits, thus the existence of multiple exit strategies is crucial factor for a healthy VC
industry; that is, the existence of the appropriate legal framework of capital market and the
extent of its enforceability.
4.2.1 The Investment Process of Venture Capital
In venture capital, the investment process involves a number of distinct stages;
however, the exact number of phases is open to debate (Boocock & Woods 1997). For
venture capital firms, it has first to raise funds from institutional investors (i.e. long-term
fund providers) to be invested in a selection of high potential deals. However, each VC
firm has its own investment strategy in sourcing potential deals which leads many firms to
specialize in specific sizes, sectors or geographic locations of ventures. (Wright and Robbie
1998). The generation of the deal is a crucial step in venture capital where many deals
were a result of network within the financial community and in other cases the government

17

(Durrani & Boocock 2006) (Freear & Wetzel 1990), (Boocock & Woods 1997).
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acted as intermediary by organizing forums to connect entrepreneurs with potential
investors. However, VC firms usually hire associates with specific skills to source good
investments. Venture capital firms conduct an initial screening to sort out unwanted
proposals either for not meeting the criteria of the firm or seem unpromising. An analysis
based on the available information (e.g. business plan, track record) is performed to
minimize agency problems associated with information asymmetry and to ascertain the
likelihood of closing the deal. The aim of the due diligence stage is to minimize the risks
of the investment by conducting a thorough investigation of the available information with
more focus on entrepreneurs’ qualities (e.g. integrity, management skills) and the
product/sector potentials such as the novelty and viability of the project. (Durrani 2006;
Klonowski 2010). However, such appraisal could be a lengthy and costly process for VC

firms which could affect the due diligence carried out. Therefore, VC firms often specialize
in particular industries or stages of ventures in order to reduce the costs of due diligence
and to use their resources and expertise more effectively. Valuation is considered the final
phase of due diligence in which the investors pursue a holistic evaluation approach and
carry out a careful risk assessment (e.g. market, technology) to determine the value of the
venture. There are a wide range of valuation methods (e.g. discounted cash flow) that varies
in accordance with the nature and the stage of the ventures, where it is more difficult to put
a value on a startup with little or no revenues comparing to mature listed businesses with
steady revenues. A greater range of valuation techniques and sensitivity analysis is needed
in early stage investment due to the greater uncertainty of cash flows in uncertain startups
environment (Wright and Robbie 1998). The structure stage generally involves decisions
on which financial instruments to be used (e.g. equity, preferred stock, debt); covenants to
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be included in the subscription agreement; and the staging of funds as a control mechanism
to minimize the risks associated with the venture. There is relatively less research done on
how venture-capital deals are structured and particularly on the selection of different
financial instruments (Wright & Robbie 1998). Several researchers claim that the use of
convertible securities fits perfectly into venture capital investment as both parties, VC firm
and entrepreneur, can gradually obtain more information on the venture. Many studies18
have showed that the use of preferred stock is the most common instrument used in venture
capital deals, particularly for financing startups. On the other hand, debt and common stock
are usually used in later stages and/or in industries where monitoring is less difficult.
Trester (1998) attributed the use of preferred stock by venture capitalists to the higher
asymmetry of information in such deals. After the investment decision, the investors’
attentions shift to monitoring the entrepreneurs’ activities to ensure the efficiency of the
venture’s operations, development of the venture in line with the pre-agreed business plan,
and the venture competitiveness in the market. In this stage, financial performance is
reviewed and audited on a regular basis (Klonowski, 2010). Moreover, communication is
considered an effective mentoring tool to reduce possible conflicts of interests and increase
the likelihood of mutual strategy choices19. The timing and the availability of exit route is
crucial in venture capital investment (Durrani 2006). The two primary exit modes are initial
public offering (IPO) and trade sales. If the venture performed well, achieved a
considerable market share and have a strong customers base, investors consider the most

18

(Norton & Tenenbaum 1992), (Berglof 1994), (Trester 1998), (Ravid & Spiegel 1997)
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(Sahlman 1990), (Bygrave and Timmons 1992), (Klonowski 2010)
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profitable exit through (IPO) initial public offering (Klonowski 2010). However, IPO
appear to become less valuable exit for venture capitalists in contrast to trade sales which
have become the most common and prominent exit mode in VC deals.
4.3

Venture Capital as A Model for Profit-Loss Sharing Finance
The nature of Islamic banks as depository institutions has prevented them from

adopting PLS based along with other risks associated with equity-based investments.
Therefore, Islamic banks became highly reliant on Murabaha (cost-plus sale) and are found
to have pursed capital accumulation rather than resources mobilization (Choudhury, 2001).
Thus, a different kind of financial intermediation has to be presented to play this role and
extend finance on the basis of PLS for SMEs on a larger scale. From an Islamic perspective,
venture capital is a ‘natural fit’ for profit-loss sharing modes (Mudaraba & Musharaka),
and are highly compatible with the objectives of Islamic finance that place higher emphasis
on risk-sharing and the economic viability of investment opportunities. The recent growth
of Islamic finance and the high demand for sharia-compatible finance present additional
opportunities for the development of Islamic venture capital. Islamic venture capital could
be a source of equity-based finance and could offer an approach for IFIs to diversify their
portfolios away from fixed-return assets. IFIs who provide PLS-based finance are similar
to VC companies that they both act as active partners who invest in collected funds and
share profits according to pre-determined ratios with their depositors/investors. Moreover,
both IFIs and VC companies in the evaluation process go beyond the entrepreneurs’ ability
to repay the loans (e.g. collateral, creditworthiness) and place a higher emphasis on the
viability of proposed ventures, market/product characteristics and the entrepreneurs’
personality and experience. As venture capital is usually associated with high-risk ventures
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or startups in uncertain environments, venture capitalists have developed complementary
mechanisms (e.g. staged finance, comprehensive contracts) to control agency problems
which are prevalent in PLS contracts. The contemporary structure of venture capital was
designed to limit agency problems in VC deals. However, as investors resort to VC
companies to reduce the cost of selecting and monitoring investment proposals, VC
companies face agency problems in their relationship with entrepreneurs, particularly at
the early stages of the investment process. It is argued that agency concerns vary
throughout the life of the ventures and that agency problems are highly likely immediately
prior to the initial investment. Therefore, VC companies typically perform due diligence,
comprehensive appraisal and stringent contracts beforehand to mitigate agency problems,
particularly adverse selection. After an investment decision is made, the likelihood of
agency concerns is argued to decline rapidly as the goals of VC company and the
entrepreneur are aligned (Arthurs & Busenitz 2003).
Moreover, the role of venture capital firms is not limited to providing finance and
it extends to play a more active role comparing to traditional financial institutions, which
increase the chances of businesses’ growth and stability. In venture capital (VC) firms, the
recovery of capital with high return depends highly on the success of the business, which
create an incentive for VC firms to get more involved in the management of funded
ventures and monitor their activity until ventures materialize. VC firms are more
specialized and more experienced in the formalization and commercialization of
businesses’ products/services; therefore, they usually engage in the selection, recruitment
and replacement of the management team of funded ventures, particularly ventures in
which the human capital is critical. VC management assumes responsibility and act as
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directors of investee firms when necessary. VC firms are usually a part of well-established
networks in their sector that include experienced infrastructure providers (e.g. accounting
firms, law firms), and other startups and established companies. Such networks could
reduce the cost of resource dependence for the investee firms and the search cost for
potentials customers, suppliers or partners since new entrepreneurs usually do not have
track records or wide contacts in the sector in which they operate to initiate business
relationships needed to promote their business.
There is no evidence that Islamic financial institutions have played any role in
providing risk-capital for small businesses and they encouraged, even if implicitly,
consumerism through the overuse of asset-based finance. However, the current structure
of Islamic banks is highly risk-averse which prevent banks from engaging in long-term
finance. The role of non-banking IFIs should be addressed in financial inclusion policies
to include religious preferences that are usually treated as ‘voluntary’ causes of financial
exclusion. The development of Islamic venture capital could fill in the gap for risk-capital
to spur innovative and technology-based businesses that is much needed for the Saudi
economy.
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A hybrid of Musharaka (partnership) and Mudaraba (silent partnership) offers a
suitable option for the development of Islamic venture capital. In the Musharaka contract,
two or more contribute to a capital, in the form of money or efforts and skills, for
investment purposes with pre-agreed profit-ratios. This structure allows investors to
include restrictive conditions on the VC fund management and/or entrepreneurs to make
any modifications or interventions to ensure the stability and efficiency of their
investments. This structure gives equal rights to both parties (fund management and
investors) to engage in the decision-making process, business operation and management
strategies even after the disbursement of funds. Another option is a hybrid of Mudaraba
and Wakalah (agency) which is an agency arrangement when investors initiate fee-based
contract with the VC fund management. This structure is deemed less flexible because it
confers the authority, within the agreed upon terms of the contract, to the fund management
to make business decision on behalf of the investors. This could make it more difficult to
resolve disputes between the investors and the fund management over investment decisions
and management of the investee companies. In regards to the relationship between the fund
management and entrepreneurs, they can initiate Mudaraba or Musharaka contract
depending on whether the fund provides all the capital or the entrepreneur contribute to the
initial capital, respectively. However, the most suitable Islamic structure for venture capital
cannot be identified until it moves from the theoretical framework to practical application.
Venture capital offers an Islamic venue for IFIs to provide equity-based finance that
promote the objectives of profit-loss sharing which Islamic banks have failed to achieve.
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4.3.1 Structure Issues
In partnerships, all parties are free to structure the contract to achieve their
economic mutual interests if does not violate Islamic principles in regard to contractual
relationships (Ahmed, 2004). Venture capitalists invest in a long-term investment for an
eventual capital gain rather than dividend income; therefore, they rarely commit
themselves to pure equity in the initial stage of investment or in the case of startups or new
industry due to the extremely high risk. Therefore, investors in conventional venture capital
use a variety of financial instruments to structure the deal in order to allocate risks, establish
ownership rights and essentially provide them with an incentive to invest. A combination
of financial instruments or a hybrid instruments are used. In regards to Islamic finance, the
use of preferred stock and the use of convertible debt are unacceptable. Preferred stock
is a hybrid instrument of bonds and stock that has a preference over common stock.
Preferred stock has a dividend that has to be paid out before dividend to common
shareholders. The Sharia objection20 is that partnership contract should not include any
terms that could eliminate profit-sharing which is the essence of the partnership contract.
Moreover, profits should be in the form of common ratios of total profits earned not the
capital. Any condition that stipulates fixed ratio or financial instrument that act as debtinstrument to guarantee a risk-free reward is unacceptable. However, this would create
disincentives to invest in new or risky ventures. In an analysis on the effect of the firm
financial structure on its investment decision, Heinkel & Zechner (1990) concluded that
preferred equity (PE) create an incentive for equity-holders to invest and enhances the

20

AAOIFI (standard 21, article 2/6)
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firm’s debt capacity. Moreover, the features of preferred stock reduce the monitoring cost
for the stockholder since it shifts part of the risk to the common stockholders. This also
explains the wide use of preferred stocks in venture capital. Several Islamic economists
have presented acceptable alternatives to preferred stock to create investment incentives
without violation of Islamic principles. An acceptable alternative has been presented in
many researches; that is a modified version of preferred stock by creating a two classes of
shares with each being entitled to a different percentage of profits beyond a defined
threshold (Al-Suhaibani & Zarqa 2012). In this case, preferred stockholders are offered a
higher percentage of any profits if their stipulated dividend has not been achieved, which
means the preferred stockholders have a preference for dividend payments until a fixed
threshold of net income is reached (Al-Suhaibani & Naifar 2014). This alternative’s
compatibility is justified on the basis of two juristic rulings; it is permissible to agree on a
profit-sharing ratio different than their capital contribution, and to make the profit-sharing
ratio variable according to the level of net income21. The development of Islamic preferred
share could provide an important financial instrument for Islamic capital markets and
increase PLS-based investments. However, the lack of the legal form of dual-class shares
should be addressed in respect to contemporary Islamic finance and offer suitable
alternatives to protect the investments of venture capitalists. Another Islamic financial
structure for venture capital is diminishing Musharaka in which the initial investment can
be secured to some extent by using the project’s asset as collateral. After profits are
achieved, the entrepreneur can buy back equity issued by venture capitalists. In regards to

21

AAOIFI (standard 12, article 3/1/5/5)
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the use of convertible debt, Islamic bond (Sukuk) is an acceptable alternative to provide
part of the initial capital which can be converted into equity after the business stabilizes
according to a predetermined conversion formula. (Durrani & Boocock 2006). The Sukuk22
Sharia-compatibility drives mainly from its asset-backed nature and that Sukuk-holders are
rewarded with a share of profits deriving from the underlying asset rather than interests
payments in conventional bonds. Furthermore, Sukuk-holders share the risk of investment
in the underlying assets; that is, face value is not always guaranteed.
Conventional Venture Capital Practice

Islamic View

Limited partnership structure
Long terms contracts
Contracts can be nullified
Restrictions placed on the activities of fund managers
Equity ratchets to entrepreneurs
Investments in equity, fully convertible bonds (zero coupon)
Preferred stocks, preference shares or convertible debt
Greater control rights through restrictive covenants
Staged financing
Liquidation rights
Application of discount rate for valuation

Acceptable
Acceptable
Acceptable
Acceptable
Acceptable
Acceptable
Not Acceptable
Acceptable
Acceptable
Acceptable
Acceptable

Table 3: Islamic view on the conventional practice of venture capital
Source: Mansoor Durrrani and Grahame Boocock 2006

4.4

Venture Capital in Saudi Arabia
The over reliance of Saudi economy on oil revenues as the main source of

government expenditure has negatively impacted the productivity of the private sector

22

Sukuk is best defined as ‘trust certificates’ and it represent undivided shares in the ownership of an
asset that generate revenues (e.g. tangible assets, leased assets, assets of special investment vehicles).
The Sukuk-holders are entitled to receive payments on the underlying trade transaction/asset and their
shares depends on the extent of their initial investment.
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which is highly dominated by few large firms; mostly, oil and petrochemicals. The
development of venture capital industry could mitigate different challenges facing the
Saudi economy such as increasing the resilience of the economy through diversification of
its economic base, increase the productivity of SMEs through fostering entrepreneurship
and the technology-intensive sectors. However, venture capital activities, particularly seed
finance, are still minimal and highly unregulated which has limited researchers from
conducting more comprehensive statistical analyses. An Islamic model for VC is nonexistent; however, an exception is high net-worth families who finance small business with
their own cash (McNamara, P et al. 2009). The venture capital compatibility with Islamic
finance offers additional opportunities to its development in the country. There are
successful experiences of Islamic venture capital in the region which can be duplicated
such as the Venture Capital Bank which is the first Islamic venture capital-based
investment bank23 with focus on the development of SMEs. The Saudi private sector is
characterized by low-skilled jobs that are concentrated in low added-value activities like
construction and trade which has been disadvantageous for the college-educated labor
force, and particularly for women. Therefore, it is acceptable to say that restructuring the
private sector and fostering entrepreneurship has an important role in reducing
unemployment and the skills-mismatch. Venture capital is a promising avenue for
entrepreneurship to link the educated labor force with sources of capital and equip them
with the necessary business skills which is not offered by traditional financial institutions.
Many factors that have restricted the role of venture capital in the country including the
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inadequacy of the current legal framework and its incompatibility to the nature of venture
capital activities such as merger and acquisition laws, weak enforcement of collaterals, and
the absence of stock exchange market for SMEs which limits exit strategies in VC
investments. The inadequacy of the legal framework for a highly speculative industry like
venture capital has led to the predominance of traditional “safe” investments and the lack
of “risk appetite”. Moreover, the serious lack of academic research and the government’s
modest funding for venture capital funds have limited the expansion of venture capital. The
limited availability of data shows that venture capital is still at early stages. Laws and
regulations directed at venture capital activities are not clearly defined. The legal and
regulatory framework is crucial for the development of venture capital industry.
Intellectual property and patents could further enhance the prospects for venture capital in
the country. Intellectual property protection is necessary condition to attract VC capital,
particularly in technology-intensive industries; however, intellectual property legislation
in the country remains below expectation (Elsiefy, 2014). Moreover, Institutional investors
(e.g. pension funds and insurance companies) are key players in venture capital finance;
however, investment in domestic capital market by such institutions is very small and
banks are not interested in such investments. Alternatively, large private firms can establish
subsidiaries for VC investments; existing examples24 are limited to technology-based
ventures. Wealthy individuals and wealthy merchant families could be another substitute
for institutional investors.

24
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Government intervention is essential to correct market failure resulting from high
asymmetries of information which led to undersupply of risk capital through traditional
financial institutions, especially for seed/early stage finance. Government direct
intervention acting as VC investor takes priority over providing incentives (e.g. tax
incentive, R&D subsidies) to stimulate venture capital investments and correct market
failure. This is because venture capitalists have a competitive advantage in dealing with
asymmetry of information in financing innovation and technology (Brander et al. 2014). In
addition to stimulate an entrepreneurship friendly ecosystem, Saudi Arabia have recently
established a Fund of Funds (FOF) with a capital of SAR 4 Billion to support SMEs’ access
to finance by investing in venture capital and private equity funds. A challenge for public
intervention is not to discourage private VC/PE investments or reduce the opportunities
available for them; thus, forcing them out of the market. Another challenge is to guarantee
the ‘additionality’ of government intervention and not become so dominant that private
investors will rely on government actors in regards to sorting out business opportunities
and due diligence instead of building these capacities themselves (Ständer, 2017).
4.5

Conclusion
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) play a vital role in most economies through

the creation of jobs, nurturing innovation and promoting growth and development.
However, access to finance is essential for SMEs growth and profitability. Generally,
SMEs face more barriers in access to finance due to the risks usually associated with small
businesses and startups and their inability to meet the requirements of traditional financial
institutions. In Saudi Arabia, access to finance is the main obstacle facing smaller
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businesses where SMEs loans represent a very small share of total loans. Alternative
finance is necessary to bolster financial inclusion and support the growth and development
of the SME sector. Venture capital plays an important role in providing the scarce riskcapital to finance the inception of innovative business ideas that has high growth potentials.
The Sharia-compatibility of the conventional practice of venture capital present an
additional opportunity to develop an Islamic model for venture capital in Saudi Arabia and
it brings the profit-loss sharing contracts into practice. The establishment of a robust
regulatory framework and a healthy infrastructure required for the development of an
Islamic venture capital that could offer Saudi Arabia many opportunities to support the
culture of ‘entrepreneurship’; nurture business innovation and technology; mitigating
financing constraints facing SMEs; diversify the economic base and reduce dependence of
government expenditure for economic growth.
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Appendix
Glossary
Murabaha: Sale at specified profit margin. Now it is used to refer to a sale arrangement
where the buyer (i.e. Islamic bank) purchase goods desired by the customer (i.e. bank
client) and sells them at an agreed marked-up price on deferred payments, in installments
or lump sum. Interest rate is used as a benchmark to determine the profit margin rate.
Musharaka: A partnership agreement in which an Islamic financial institution and
customers contribute capital to a new or existing enterprise or to the ownership of an asset.
Profits are shared according to a pre-agreed ratios and loss is strictly borne by respective
capital contribution.
Mudaraba: A partnership contract where one party (Rab al-Mal) provides capital and the
other (Mudarib) provides expertise and management to an enterprise. Profits are shared
according to pre-agreed ratios and loss is borne only by the capital provider and the
manager’s liability is limited to his effort. Mudaraba can be restricted where the capital
provider can define clear guidelines for the use of capital and risk exposure or it can be
unrestricted where the capital provider allows the the manager to manage the capital with
no restrictions.
Diminishing Musharaka: A form of partnership in investment or purchase of an asset in
which one agrees to buy the other’s equity share gradually, through a redeeming
mechanism agreed by both partners, until all equity is transferred to the buying partner or
become the sole owner of the asset. The buying and selling of equity should take a place at
market value.
Ijara (Leasing): Leasing contract of an asset (e.g. machinery) that generate usufruct over
time. The usufruct is sold to the lessee at predetermined price. The lessor retains the
ownership of the asset with with all rights and responsibilities that go with ownership.
Salam (advanced payments for goods): A forward sale contract in which an advance
payment is made for commodities (mainly agricultural crops) to be delivered at a future
date. The object of the sale can include anything and mostly tangible things but cannot be
gold or silver because these are regarded as monetary values.
Istisna’a: an instrument of pre-shipment financing. Manufacturing contract whereby a
manufacturer agrees to produce (build) and deliver a well-described good (or premise) at a
given price on a given date in the future. This flexibility allows the bank to pre-sell to its
clients for future delivery on a cash-on-delivery basis and then negotiate the purchase.
Sharia-compliant: Sharia refers to the corpus of Islamic laws on divine guidelines as given
by the Qur’an and Sunnah. In Islamic finance, Sharia-compliance describes in detail what
is permissible and what is not permissible for all behavioral and contractual relationships.
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